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European air passenger rights: 
delay and cancellation
renzo Van der Bruggen*
La protection des passagers en droit de l’UE a été entamée voici plus de 20 ans. Le cadre actuel, 
formé par le règlement (CE) n° 261/2004, suscite d’importantes questions, notamment concer-
nant les notions de délai et d’annulation. Ces deux notions vont être examinées dans la présente 
contribution, en se référant à la jurisprudence de la C.J.U.E.
The protection of passengers by EU law dates back more than 20 years. The current framework, 
in particular Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, raises important issues, such as the notions of 
delay and cancellation. These two concepts are discussed in this contribution, with reference to 
C.J.E.U. case law.
Introduction
The eruption of Iceland’s Eyjafjallajökull volcano on 14 April 2010 had an enormous 
impact on the aviation sector. Due to the ash cloud, many European countries had 
to close their airspace for several days, and during the eight‑ day crisis that followed 
approximately 104 000 flights were cancelled and around 10 million passengers were 
unable to travel. People found themselves stranded far from home, or were unable to 
take flights they had paid for. 1
In addition to the problems faced by passengers, air transport actors incurred signifi‑
cant costs and suffered reduced revenues, with a significant effect on their profits. 2 The 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) estimated that the Icelandic volcano cri‑
 1 See Eurocontrol, “
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Ash‑cloud of April and May 2010: Impact on Air Traffic” (https://www.euro‑
control.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/official‑ documents/facts‑ and‑ figures/statfor/
ash‑ impact‑ air‑ traffic‑ 2010.pdf, 1 and 7); European Commission, 27 April 2010, SEC(2010) 533, 
para. 2 and 10.
 2 See European Commission, 27 April 2010, SEC(2010) 533, para. 2 and 10.
sis cost airlines more than US$ 1,7 billion worldwide in lost revenue in the six days fol‑
lowing the initial eruption. Airlines also faced the cost of providing hotel accommodation 
and other assistance to stranded passengers. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) 
has estimated that it cost just under EUR 200 million for passenger rights exposure for 
their member airlines, who provided 40‑50% of the seats in the affected airspace. 3
By 22 April 2010 almost all airspace had been re‑ opened. However, in the following 
days another 67 000 flights were cancelled, affecting 5,5  million passengers. 4 Data 
shows that the ash cloud continued to have a significant effect in the following month 
– in May around 43% of flights were delayed on departure. 5
The Air Passenger Rights Regulation (APRR) 6 established the minimum rights 
for passengers whose flights are cancelled or delayed, and for passengers who have 
been denied boarding. The APRR was one of the first passenger rights regulations, 
and has suffered severe problems from its inception. Essential concepts were not 
defined (“cancellation” was defined, whereas “delay” was not), it was unclear which 
passenger rights applied to which situation (does a re‑ booking, missed connection, 
altered itinerary, etc. constitute a “cancelled” or “delayed” flight?), the conditions it 
set out were vague or inconsistent (delayed departure and/or delayed arrival?), etc. 
The APRR was interpreted differently, and thus was applied differently, by air carri‑
ers and national enforcement authorities. 7 It also failed to address some of the most 
pressing problems, and did not fully resolve a number of key issues that it attempted 
to tackle. As a result, important gaps remained, leading to a lack of clarity in theory 
and in practice.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (C.J.E.U., or the Court) has attempted 
to fill these gaps. It has defined any concepts that lacked a definition, re‑ interpreted 
concepts that had already been defined, and even took up the role of “praetorian legis‑
lator” (passenger rights were added to the APRR).
This paper begins by setting out air passengers’ rights in the event of cancelled or 
delayed flights (section I). 8 It then discusses the C.J.E.U.’s interpretation of the terms 
 3 See IATA, “Economic briefing May 2010: The impact of the Eyjafjallajökull’s volcanic ash plume” 
(http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Volcanic‑ Ash‑ Plume‑ May2010.pdf, 
3‑4); European Commission, 27 April 2010, SEC(2010) 533, para. 14.
 4 See European Commission, 27 April 2010, SEC(2010) 533, para. 12.
 5 Eurocontrol, “Ash‑cloud of April and May 2010: Impact on Air Traffic” (https://www.euro‑
control.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/official‑ documents/facts‑ and‑ figures/statfor/
ash‑ impact‑ air‑ traffic‑ 2010.pdf, 17).
 6 Regulation 261/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 esta‑
blishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding 
and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation 295/1991/EEC, OJ 2004 L 46/1.
 7 European Commission, 11 April 2011, COM(2011) 174 final, 2.
 8 This paper will not specifically discuss “denied boarding”.
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“cancellation” and “delay” in two judgments. 9 The first of these relates to the Sturgeon 
case 10 (section II); the facts are presented (A and B), the distinction between “cancella‑
tion” and “delay” is explored (C) and the praetorian right to financial compensation in 
the case of a delay is analysed (D), including the Court’s calculation error (D., 2 and 
D., 3). The second judgment relates to the Sousa Rodríguez case 11 (section III); the facts 
are presented (A), the Court’s “itinerary” or “original planning” criterion is analysed 
(B), the problems regarding a “replacement” flight are discussed (C) and other criteria 
that indicate a “cancellation” are examined (D). The predecessors and successors of 
both cases, and their repercussions, are identified (II., E and III., E). Finally, general 
conclusions are drawn (section IV).
I. – The Air Passenger Rights Regulation
a. – cancellation
Definition – The APRR defines “cancellation” as “the non‑ operation of a flight which 
was previously planned and on which at least one place was reserved” (article 2(l)). 12
Passenger rights – First, the passenger can choose between reimbursement 13 or re‑ 
routing. 14 More specifically, he or she must be offered the choice between: (i) reim‑
bursement within seven days of the full cost of the ticket at the price at which it was 
bought, for the part or parts of the journey not made, and for the part or parts already 
made if the flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger’s original 
travel plan, together with, when relevant, a return flight to the first point of departure, 
at the earliest opportunity; (ii) re‑ routing, under comparable transport conditions, to 
the passenger’s final destination at the earliest opportunity; or (iii) re‑ routing, under 
comparable transport conditions, to their final destination at a later date at the passen‑
ger’s convenience, subject to availability of seats (article 5(1)(a) juncto article 8(1)).
Second, the operating air carrier must offer, free of charge, the following assistance: 
(i) meals and refreshments in a reasonable relation to the waiting time; (ii) two tele‑
 9 This paper builds on previous research: R. van der Bruggen, “Vertraagde en geannuleerde vluchten 
in de Europese luchtvaart: een vlucht doorheen de criteria van het Hof van Justitie”, DCCR, 2012, 
No 96, 5‑42.
 10 C.J.E.U., Joined Cases C‑ 402/07 (Sturgeon) and C‑ 432/07 (Böck). Hereinafter “Sturgeon case”.
 11 C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 83/10 (Sousa Rodríguez). Hereinafter “Sousa Rodríguez case”.
 12 Unless otherwise stated, article references are to the articles of the APRR.
 13 Paid in cash, by electronic bank transfer, bank orders or bank cheques or, with the signed agreement 
of the passenger, in travel vouchers and/or other services (article 8(1)(a) juncto article 7(3)).
 14 When, in the case where a town, city or region is served by several airports, an operating air carrier 
offers a passenger a flight to an airport alternative to that for which the booking was made, the operating 
air carrier shall bear the cost of transferring the passenger from that alternative airport either to that for 
which the booking was made, or to another close‑ by destination agreed with the passenger (article 8(3)).
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phone calls, telex or fax messages or emails. In the event of re‑ routing, when the 
reasonably expected time of departure of the new flight is at least the day after the 
departure that was planned for the cancelled flight, the operating air carrier must also 
offer: (iii) hotel accommodation in cases where a stay of one or more nights becomes 
necessary, or where a stay additional to that intended by the passenger becomes nec‑
essary; and (iv) transport between the airport and place of accommodation, hotel or 
other (article 5(1)(b) juncto articles 9(1) and 9(2)). 15
Third, the passengers concerned are entitled to EUR  250‑600 compensation, 16 
with the amount dependent on the distance of the flight. 17 When passengers are 
offered re‑ routing to their final destination on an alternative flight (pursuant to arti‑
cle  8), the operating air carrier may reduce this compensation by 50% when the 
arrival time of the alternative flight does not exceed the scheduled arrival time of 
the flight originally booked by two, three or four hours (depending on the distance 
of the flight). 18 Passengers have no right to compensation when they are informed 
of the cancellation: (i) at least two weeks before the scheduled time of departure; or 
(ii) between two weeks and seven days before the scheduled time of departure and 
are offered re‑ routing, allowing them to depart no more than two hours before the 
scheduled time of departure and to reach their final destination less than four hours 
after the scheduled time of arrival; or (iii) less than seven days before the scheduled 
time of departure and are offered re‑ routing, allowing them to depart no more than 
one hour before the scheduled time of departure and to reach their final destination 
less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival (article  5(1)(c) juncto arti‑
cles 7(1) and 7(2)). 19 20 
 15 The operating air carrier is also obliged to pay particular attention to the needs of people with 
reduced mobility and anyone accompanying them, and to the needs of unaccompanied children 
(article 5(1)(b) juncto article 9(3)).
 16 Paid in cash, by electronic bank transfer, bank orders or bank cheques or, with the signed agreement 
of the passenger, in travel vouchers and/or other services (article 7(3)).
 17 Article 7(1): (a) EUR 250 for all flights of 1 500 km or less; (b) EUR 400 for all intra‑ Community 
flights of more than 1 500 km, and for all other flights between 1 500 and 3 500 km; (c) EUR 600 for 
all flights not falling under (a) or (b). In determining the distance, the basis shall be the last destination 
at which the cancellation will delay the passenger’s arrival after the scheduled time (article 7(1), last 
sentence). The given distances shall be measured by the great circle route method (article 7(4)).
 18 Article 7(2): (a) Two hours in respect of all flights of 1 500 km or less; (b) Three hours in respect 
of all intra‑ Community flights of more than 1 500 km and for all other flights between 1 500 and 
3 500 km; (c) Four hours in respect of all flights not falling under (a) or (b). The given distances shall 
be measured by the great circle route method (article 7(4)).
 19 When passengers are informed of the cancellation, they must also be told about possible alternative 
transport. The burden of proof regarding the question as to whether and when the passenger has been 
informed of the flight’s cancellation shall rest with the operating air carrier (articles 5(2) and 5(4)).
 20 As regards time limits for bringing actions concerning the compensation under articles 5 and 7, 
the C.J.E.U. decided that “[The APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that the time‑ limits for 
bringing actions for compensation under articles 5 and 7 […] are determined in accordance with 
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The answer to the question of whether a flight may or may not be considered can‑
celled also answers the question of whether a passenger is entitled to these rights.
b. – delay
Definition – The APRR does not define “delay”.
Passenger rights – When the operating air carrier reasonably expects a flight to be 
delayed beyond its scheduled time of departure for two, three, four hours or more 
(depending on the distance of the flight), 21 it must offer, free of charge, the following 
assistance: (i) meals and refreshments in a reasonable relation to the waiting time; and 
(ii) two telephone calls, telex or fax messages or emails. If the reasonably expected 
time of departure is at least the day after the time of departure previously announced, 
the operating air carrier must additionally offer: (iii) hotel accommodation in cases 
where a stay of one or more nights becomes necessary, or where a stay additional 
to that intended by the passenger becomes necessary; and (iv) transport between the 
airport and place of accommodation, hotel or other (articles 6(1)(i) and 6(1)(ii) juncto 
articles 9(1) and 9(2)). 22
However, when the delay is at least five hours passengers must be offered reim‑
bursement 23 within seven days of the full cost of the ticket at the price at which it 
was bought, for the part or parts of the journey not made, and for the part or parts 
already made if the flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger’s 
original travel plan, together with, when relevant, a return flight to the first point of 
departure, at the earliest opportunity (article 6(1)(iii) juncto article 8(1)(a)).
In any event, the assistance must be offered within the time limits set out above with 
respect to each distance bracket (article 6(2)).
The APRR does not make provision for compensation to be paid in cases where 
there is a “delay”. However, the C.J.E.U. decided in the Sturgeon case that:
“Articles 5, 6 and 7 [APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose 
flights are delayed may be treated, for the purposes of the application of the right to 
the rules of each Member State on the limitation of actions” (C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 139/11 (Cuadrench 
Moré), dictum).
 21 Article  6(1): (a) Two hours or more in the case of flights of 1 500 km or less; (b) Three hours 
or more in the case of all intra‑ Community flights of more than 1 500 km and of all other flights 
between 1 500 and 3 500 km; (c) Four hours or more in the case of all flights not falling under (a) 
or (b).
 22 In applying this assistance, the operating air carrier has to pay particular attention to the needs of 
people with reduced mobility and anyone accompanying them, and to the needs of unaccompanied 
children (articles 6(1)(i) and 6(1)(ii) juncto article 9(3)).
 23 Paid in cash, by electronic bank transfer, bank orders or bank cheques or, with the signed agreement 
of the passenger, in travel vouchers and/or other services (article 8(1)(a) juncto article 7(3)).
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compensation, as passengers whose flights are cancelled and they may thus rely on 
the right to compensation laid down in article 7 [APRR] where they suffer, on account of 
a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is, where they reach 
their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled 
by the air carrier […]” (C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, dictum 2).
c. – extraordinary circumstances
If the operating air carrier can prove that the cancellation is caused by “extraordi‑
nary circumstances” that could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures 
had been taken, the carrier shall not be obliged to pay compensation in accordance 
with article  7. 24 How the concept “extraordinary circumstances” should be inter‑
preted has already been widely discussed, 25 and this paper will not discuss that prob‑
lem further.
II. – The Sturgeon case:  
delay and cancellation, fraternal twins?
In the Sturgeon judgment, the C.J.E.U. assessed two cases jointly, in order to make 
a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of articles 2(l), 5, 6 and 7. The references 
were made, first, in proceedings between Christopher Sturgeon with his family, 26 and 
the air carrier Condor Flugdienst GmbH 27 (C‑ 402/07), and second in proceedings 
between Stefan Böck with Cornelia Lepuschitz, and the air carrier Air France SA 28 
(C‑ 432/07). Both air carriers refused to pay these passengers (who arrived 25 and 
22 hours after the scheduled arrival time, respectively) EUR 600 compensation per 
person.
 24 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, dictum 2; Article 5(3).
 25 Judgments of the C.J.E.U.: Case C‑ 344/04 (International Air Transport Association); Joined Cases 
C‑ 402/07 (Sturgeon) and C‑ 432/07 (Böck); Case C‑ 549/07 (Wallentin- Hermann); Case C‑ 529/08 
(Schulze); Case C‑ 294/10 (Eglïtis); Case C‑ 12/11 (McDonagh); Case C‑ 22/11 (Finnair); Case 
C‑ 509/11 (ÖBB- Personenverkehr AG).
Orders of the C.J.E.U.: Case C‑ 394/14 (Siewert).
Requests for a C.J.E.U. preliminary ruling: Case C‑ 150/12 (Brännström); Case C‑ 316/12 (Guevara 
Kamm); Case C‑ 68/13 (Weiss); Case C‑ 347/13 (Pickert); Case C‑ 353/13 (Hein); Case C‑ 575/13 
(Etzold); Case C‑ 658/13 (Spitzner); Case C‑ 46/14 (Kaiser); Case C‑ 119/14 (Niessen); Case C‑ 257/14 
(van der Lans); Case C‑ 279/14 (Smets); Case C‑ 316/14 (Hußock); Case C‑ 337/14 (Mandl); Case 
C‑ 364/14 (Lorch); Case C‑ 365/14 (Liebler); Case C‑ 382/14 (Schneider); Case C‑ 412/14 (Wedel).
 26 Hereinafter “the Sturgeons”.
 27 Hereinafter “Condor”.
 28 Hereinafter “Air France”.
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a. – sturgeon (c- 402/07): the facts
The Sturgeons booked return tickets with Condor from Frankfurt am Main (Ger‑
many) to Toronto (Canada). They were due to return on a flight leaving Toronto on 
9 July 2005 at 16.20. In reality, the Sturgeons did not depart until the following day, 
and arrived in Frankfurt on 11 July 2005 at 07.00 or 07.15.
According to the Sturgeons, on 9  July 2005 at around 23.30 the flight’s captain 
announced that the flight was being cancelled, and the same information was shown 
on the departures board. The family’s luggage, which had already been loaded, was 
returned to them, and they were transferred to a hotel to spend the night (arriving 
there at 02.30). On the following day the Sturgeons had to check in again (at a dif‑
ferent air carrier’s counter), were allocated different seats, and had to go through 
security once again. However, the flight number of the flight back, now one day later, 
corresponded to the flight number on their original booking. Condor did not schedule 
another flight with the same number for the day concerned and the Sturgeons’ booking 
was not converted into a booking for a flight scheduled by another airline.
The Sturgeons held the view that, in the light of these circumstances (particularly 
the delay of more than 25  hours), the flight had been cancelled, not delayed, and 
therefore they are entitled to compensation of EUR 600 per person (plus damages). 
According to Condor, the flight had been delayed and they are therefore not obliged 
to pay this compensation. 29 Prior to the proceedings before the national court, Condor 
claimed that the flight had been delayed as the result of a hurricane in the Caribbean, 
but during the proceedings it attributed the delay to technical faults on the plane and 
illness among the crew.
The Bundesgerichtshof wanted more clarity on the distinction between “cancella‑
tion” and “delay” and referred the following questions to the C.J.E.U. for a prelimi‑
nary ruling:
“1. Is it decisive for the interpretation of the term ‘cancellation’ whether the original 
flight planning is abandoned, with the result that a delay, regardless of how long, 
does not constitute a cancellation if the air carrier does not actually abandon the 
planning for the original flight?
2. If question 1 is answered in the negative: in what circumstances is a delay of the 
planned flight no longer to be regarded as a delay but as a cancellation? Is the answer 
to this question dependent on the length of the delay?”
 29 In the case of the cancellation of a flight: the passengers concerned are, in principle, entitled to 
EUR 250‑600 compensation, depending on the distance of the flight (articles 5(1)(c) and 5(3) juncto 
article 7).
In the case of the delay of a flight: the EUR 250‑600 compensation (cf. cancellation) is not envisaged 
by the APRR.
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b. – böck and lepuschitz (c- 432/07): the facts
Stefan Böck and Cornelia Lepuschitz booked a flight from Vienna to Mexico City 
with Air France. Their journey was divided into the following legs: Vienna‑ Paris and 
Paris‑ Mexico City (on 18  February 2005); Cancún‑ Mexico City and Mexico City‑ 
Paris (on 7 March 2005); Paris‑ Vienna (on 8 March 2005).
As Böck and Lepuschitz were checking in for flight AF439 departing from Mexico 
City on 7 March 2005 at 21.30, they were informed (before the check‑ in actually took 
place) that their flight had been cancelled. The cancellation resulted from: (1) a change 
in the flight planning between Mexico City and Paris, which arose because of a tech‑
nical breakdown on the aircraft due to fly from Paris to Mexico City; and (2) the need 
to observe the rest period prescribed by law for the crew. In response to their request 
for an alternative flight, Böck and Lepuschitz were offered seats on a flight operated by 
Continental Airlines (under flight number CO1725Y), which was scheduled to leave 
Mexico City the following day, 8 March 2005, at 12.20. In order to have “new” tickets 
issued to them, they had to request confirmation from Air France’s office in Mexico 
City, which enabled them to obtain the tickets from the Continental Airlines ticket 
counter (after their “old” tickets had been cancelled).
The remaining passengers who should have travelled on 7  March 2005 on flight 
AF439, and who were not re‑ booked onto the Continental Airlines flight, took a plane 
bearing the registration FGSPV on 8  March 2005 from Mexico City to Paris. This 
flight departed at 19.35 with a slightly modified flight number (AF439A), and arrived 
in Paris on 9 March 2005 at 13.09, in parallel with the regular flight scheduled by Air 
France on 8 March 2005.
Air France offered Böck and Lepuschitz hotel accommodation, food and transfers to 
and from the hotel. The couple finally arrived in Vienna 22 hours after the scheduled 
time of arrival (of their original flight) and claimed that Air France should pay each of 
them EUR 600 by way of compensation for the cancellation of their flight. 30
The Handelsgericht Wien decided to refer the following questions to the C.J.E.U. 
for a preliminary ruling:
“1. Must article 5, read in conjunction with articles 2(l) and 6 [APRR], be inter‑
preted as meaning that a 22 hour delay in the time of departure constitutes a ‘delay’ 
within the meaning of article 6?
2. Must article 2(l) [APRR] be interpreted as meaning that instances in which pas‑
sengers are transported significantly later (22 hours later) on a flight operating under 
a longer flight number (original flight number supplemented by an ‘A’) and carrying 
 30 Pursuant to article 5 juncto article 7(1)(c).
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only an – albeit large – proportion of the passengers booked on the initial flight, but 
also additional passengers not booked on the initial flight, constitute ‘cancellations’ 
rather than ‘delays’?
If question 2 is to be answered in the affirmative:
3. Must article 5(3) [APRR] be interpreted as meaning that technical problems with 
a plane and the resulting changes to the flight schedule represent extraordinary cir‑
cumstances (which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had 
been taken)?”
c. – delay ≠ cancellation
Two distinct categories –  The APRR contains no definition of “(flight) delay”. The 
C.J.E.U. wished to clarify this concept in the light of the context in which it occurs 
and referred to the interpretation it gave to the term “flight” in the Emirates Airlines 
case. 31  32 According to the Court, the itinerary is an essential element of the flight, as 
the flight is operated in accordance with the carrier’s pre‑ arranged planning. Because 
of this and the fact that European Union (EU) legislature adopted a notion of flight 
delay that is considered only by reference to the scheduled departure time, the Court 
decided that a flight is delayed “if it is operated in accordance with the original planning 
and its actual departure time is later than the scheduled departure time”. 33
Flight cancellation, unlike delay, would be the result of the non‑ operation of a flight 
that was previously planned. Cancelled flights and delayed flights are thus two distinct 
categories of flights. It cannot therefore be inferred from the APRR that a flight that is 
delayed may be classified as a “cancelled flight” simply because the delay is extended, even 
substantially, according to the Court. It therefore concluded that a flight that is delayed, 
irrespective of the duration of the delay (even if it is very long), cannot be regarded as 
cancelled where there is a departure in accordance with the original planning. 34
 31 “The concept of ‘flight’ within the meaning of [the APRR] must be interpreted as consisting essentially 
in an air transport operation, being as it were a ‘unit’ of such transport, performed by an air carrier 
which fixes its itinerary. It follows that a journey out and back cannot be regarded as a single flight. 
Consequently, article 3(1)(a) of that regulation, which provides that the regulation is to apply to passen‑
gers departing from an airport located in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies, 
must be interpreted as not applying to the case of an outward and return journey in which passengers who 
have originally departed from an airport located in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty 
applies travel back to that airport on a flight from an airport located in a non‑ member country. The fact 
that the outward and return flights are the subject of a single booking has no effect on the interpretation 
of that provision”. See C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 173/07 (Emirates Airlines), para. 40, 47, 53 and dictum.
 32 For the interpretation on the concept of “flight”, see also R. van der Bruggen, “European air passen‑
ger rights: the concept of ‘flight’”, EUVR, 2014, No 4, 233‑249.
 33 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 29‑32.
 34 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 33‑34.
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Departures board and staff information are not relevant – In the opinion of the C.J.E.U., 
displaying the words “delayed” or “cancelled” on the airport departures board, or an 
announcement by the air carrier’s staff, are not criteria to label a flight as delayed or 
cancelled. 35
In line with the general trend in consumer law, the APRR requires the “strong party” 
to provide a relatively large amount of information for consumers. The operating air 
carrier must ensure that the following legal notice is displayed at check‑ in, in a man‑
ner that is clearly visible (and legible) to passengers: “If you are denied boarding or if 
your flight is cancelled or delayed for at least two hours, ask at the check‑ in counter or 
boarding gate for the text stating your rights, particularly with regard to compensation 
and assistance”. When cancelling a flight, the operating air carrier must provide each 
passenger affected with a written notice setting out the rules for compensation and 
assistance in line with the APRR. Passengers affected by a delay of at least two hours 
must receive an equivalent notice. The passengers must also be given, in written form, 
the contact details of the national body designated as responsible for the enforcement 
of the APRR and to which each passenger may complain about an alleged infringement. 
These provisions must be applied using appropriate alternative means for the benefit of 
people who are blind or visually impaired and may not be limited or waived, notably 
by derogation or a restrictive clause in the contract of carriage. 36 The APRR clearly 
attaches considerable importance to providing passengers with the correct informa‑
tion very quickly. Stating that announcements shown on an airport departures board 
(which is often where passengers first obtain the information) or announcements made 
by the air carrier’s staff (who are in a position of trust from the point of view of passen‑
gers) are not criteria that can be used to label a flight as delayed or cancelled is, in this 
context, very contradictory. A survey (ordered by the European Commission) on air 
passengers’ rights found that Europeans are inadequately informed about their rights, 
are unaware of their reinforced rights pursuant to the APRR and are dissatisfied with 
the information they are provided with when they suffer an inconvenience. 37
The composition of the group of passengers is not relevant –  The Court correctly states 
that it is not necessary for the group of passengers who initially held reservations to be 
essentially identical to that of the group subsequently transported. As the delay grows 
 35 According to the C.J.E.U., this announcement is, similar to the fact that passengers recover their 
luggage or obtain new boarding cards, not a deciding factor. These circumstances are not connected 
with the objective characteristics of the flight as such. They can therefore be attributable to inaccurate 
classifications or to factors obtaining in the airport concerned or, yet again, they may be unavoidable 
given the waiting time and the fact that it is necessary for the passengers concerned to spend the night 
in a hotel. See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 37.
 36 Articles 14‑15.
 37 See TNS Opinion and Social, Special Eurobarometer 319/Report, 52; TNS Opinion and Social, 
Special Eurobarometer 319/Summary, 21.
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longer by reference to the departure time originally scheduled, the number of passen‑
gers in the first of those groups may decrease – some passengers may have been offered 
re‑ routing on another flight, and others may have decided not to take the delayed flight. 
Conversely, there is nothing to prevent the carrier accepting additional passengers to 
the extent that seats have become available on the flight for which the booking was 
made (before the departure of the plane that is delayed). 38 This thought is not only log‑
ical but also prevents bad incentives for air carriers; if the composition of the group had 
an impact on the flight’s qualification, air carriers would not be encouraged to transport 
passengers who had experienced delays as quickly as possible to their destination.
What is relevant? – In the C.J.E.U.’s opinion, a flight with a departure time that is 
later than the originally scheduled departure time can be classified as “cancelled” only if 
the air carrier arranges for the passengers to be carried on another flight whose original 
planning is different from that of the flight for which the booking was made. 39 The 
Court continues by saying that it is possible, as a rule, to conclude that a cancellation 
has occurred where the delayed flight for which the booking was made is “rolled over” 
onto another flight, that is to say where the planning for the original flight is aban‑
doned and the passengers from that flight join passengers on a flight that was planned 
independently of the flight for which the passengers so transferred had made their 
bookings. This last‑ mentioned consideration differs on three points with the preceding 
one: (1) “departure time” has been left out; 40 (2) the planning for the original flight has 
to be abandoned; 41 and (3) the “replacement flight” has to be a flight (with passengers) 
that was also planned (independently of the original flight). 42 Whatever the conse‑
quences of these differences, “a flight which is delayed, irrespective of the duration of 
the delay, even if it is long, cannot be regarded as cancelled where the flight is oper‑
ated in accordance with the air carrier’s original planning”. 43
 38 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 38.
 39 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 35.
 40 It would only be a cancellation according to the last consideration if a flight departs on time, but is 
held up while flying (due to technical problems), forcing its passengers to transfer to another plane 
(after futile attempts to repair the technical problems at an airport of a scheduled intermediate 
 landing).
 41 This was not required by the preceding consideration. The question of whether or not the abandoned 
original flight requires the adoption of an express decision has been answered by the Sousa Rodríguez 
case. “It in no way follows from the definition in article 2(1) [APRR] that, in addition to the fact that 
the initially scheduled flight was not operated, the ‘cancellation’ of that flight, within the meaning 
of article 2(1), requires the adoption of an express decision cancelling it” (C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez 
case, para. 29).
 42 The original planned flight would only be cancelled according to the first consideration if an ad hoc 
“replacement flight” was organised for the “rolled over” passengers. According to the last considera‑
tion, the original planned flight is only cancelled if the “replacement flight” had already been planned 
and would have flown anyhow (independently of the original flight for which the passengers so 
transferred had made their bookings).
 43 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 39.
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Evaluation – Is it logical to deduce from the conclusion that there are two distinct 
categories of flights, that a transition from the category “delayed” to the category “can‑
celled” is only possible in cases where (a) a flight has a departure time that is later than 
the departure time originally scheduled and (b) the air carrier (c) arranges for the 
passengers to be carried on another flight (d) whose original planning is different from 
that of the flight for which the booking was made? Many questions present themselves: 
What if the passengers are carried by another air carrier? What if the passengers are 
carried by another aeroplane (with or without the same flight number)? What is the 
value of a flight number? Is time never a criterion? What about the situation in which 
an aeroplane takes off (on time) but is forced to return to the airport of departure 
(due to technical problems) and, for example, does not depart at all, or departs a 
few hours late? How would itinerary changes be assessed? What if passengers have to 
change planes at the airport of an unscheduled intermediate landing? (Etc.). Our quest 
for a (better) criterion to determine the transition from the category “delayed” to the 
category “cancelled” will begin at the discussion of the Sousa Rodríguez case (infra, sec‑
tion III, B).
d. – right to compensation in case of delay
The previous section reviewed the Court’s urge to stick to the letter of the Regu‑
lation and its two distinct categories. In this section we will reflect on its passenger‑ 
friendly U‑ turn. Although the C.J.E.U. does not want to tamper – at least not the‑
oretically – with the APRR’s dichotomy, it de facto removes the distinction between 
“delay” and “cancellation”.
1. – Why?
Not literally 44 – To start with, the C.J.E.U. states that it does not expressly follow 
from the wording of the APRR that passengers whose flights are delayed, in contrast 
to passengers whose flights are cancelled, may be entitled to compensation. Never‑
theless, as the Court has made clear in its case law, it is necessary, in interpreting a 
provision of Community law, to consider not only its wording but also the context in 
which it occurs and the objectives it aims to achieve by the rules of which it is part. The 
operative part of a Community act is therefore indissolubly linked to the statement of 
the reasons for it, so that, when it has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the 
reasons that led to its adoption.
In the case of “extraordinary circumstances”, article 5(3) provides air carriers with 
the opportunity to be released from the obligation to pay EUR 250‑600 financial com‑
 44 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 41‑48.
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pensation. This article concerns flight cancellation. Recital 15 Preamble APRR states 
that “extraordinary circumstances” may also be relied on when an air traffic manage‑
ment decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a particular day gives rise to “a long 
delay [or] an overnight delay”. As the notion of long delay is mentioned in the context 
of extraordinary circumstances, it must be understood, according to the Court, that 
the legislature also linked that notion to the right to compensation. Recital 15 Pream‑
ble APRR seems, rather, to be an attempt to clarify “extraordinary circumstances” by 
using examples, or to put some situations on a par with extraordinary circumstances:
“Extraordinary circumstances should be deemed to exist where the impact of an air 
traffic management decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a particular day 
gives rise to a long delay, an overnight delay, or the cancellation of one or more 
flights by that aircraft, even though all reasonable measures had been taken by the air 
carrier concerned to avoid the delays or cancellations” (Recital 15 Preamble APRR).
Recitals 1‑4 Preamble APRR are believed by the C.J.E.U. to confirm its opinion. 
These four Recitals underscore in general terms the importance of a high level of 
protection for passengers, without making a distinction between “delay” and “can‑
cellation” (and “denied boarding”). The question then arises as to whether this omis‑
sion was intentional or merely a consequence of the function of the first few Recitals 
in a Preamble (which can be assumed to provide a general introduction with few 
differentiations).
Furthermore, the Court states that the provisions conferring rights on air passengers, 
including those conferring a right to compensation, must be interpreted broadly, and, 
where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference 
must be given to the interpretation that ensures the provision retains its effectiveness.
The C.J.E.U. therefore concludes that it cannot automatically be presumed that 
passengers whose flights are delayed do not have a right to compensation and cannot, 
for the purposes of recognition of such a right, be treated as passengers whose flights 
are cancelled.
Equal treatment 45 – One of the EU’s “ten commandments” is the principle of equal‑
ity. This principle precludes comparable situations from being treated differently, 
and different situations from being treated in the same way, unless the treatment is 
objectively justified. The Court reminds us that the APRR seeks to redress damage 
suffered by air passengers during air travel in an immediate and standardised manner, 
and decides to compare the situation of passengers whose flights are delayed with that 
of passengers whose flights are cancelled. Both categories of passengers suffer the same 
damage: loss of time. This sort of damage can only be redressed by compensation, 
 45 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 49‑61.
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given that it is irreversible. The Court decides, on this point, that both categories of 
passengers suffer similar damage and find themselves in a similar situation to which the 
right to EUR 250‑600 compensation applies.
To clarify the comparison, the Court states that the situation of (a) passengers whose 
flights are delayed hardly differs from the situation of (b) passengers whose flights are 
cancelled and who are only informed about the cancellation when they arrive at the 
airport but fortunately can take a replacement flight later on. Both categories of pas‑
sengers are informed at the same time about the incident that hampers their transport 
by air and the fact that they will reach their destination later than planned. Therefore, 
both categories suffer a similar loss of time.
The latter passengers (b) are those who are told less than seven days before the 
departure time that their flight is cancelled and who are offered re‑ routing. These 
re‑ routed passengers have (under article 5(1)(c)(iii)) the right to compensation if the 
carrier fails to re‑ route them on a flight that departs no more than one hour before 
the scheduled time of departure and reaches their final destination less than two hours 
after the scheduled time of arrival. The Court infers that these passengers can there‑
fore claim compensation when the loss of time is three or more hours with respect to 
the carrier’s original planning.
According to the C.J.E.U., if passengers whose flight is delayed cannot claim the 
EUR  250‑600 financial compensation they will have received less favourable treat‑
ment, although they suffered a similar time loss of three hours or more. The Court 
sees no objective ground to justify this unequal treatment and therefore concludes that 
“passengers whose flights are delayed may rely on the right to compensation laid down 
in article 7 [APRR] where they suffer, on account of such flights, a loss of time equal to 
or in excess of three hours, that is to say when they reach their final destination three 
hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier”. 46
Moreover, this solution would correspond with Recital 15 Preamble APRR. As 
the Court said earlier in this judgment, it assumes that the legislator (by means of 
Recital 15) has also linked the right to compensation to a “long delay”. This term “long 
delay” concerns a delay to which the legislator links legal consequences. Since article 6 
already attaches legal consequences to the delay of certain flights with two hours or more 
(meals and refreshments plus two telephone calls, telex or fax messages, or emails) 47, 
Recital 15 Preamble APRR necessarily covers delays of three hours or more, according to 
the Court.
 46 C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 61.
 47 See articles 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(i) juncto articles 9(1)(a) and (2).
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2. – When?
Calculation method – According to article 5(1)(c)(iii), passengers who are informed of 
the cancellation less than seven days before the scheduled time of departure have the 
right to be compensated by the operating air carrier, unless they are offered re‑ routing 
that allows them (a) to depart no more than one hour before the scheduled time of depar‑
ture and (b) to reach their final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time 
of arrival. This rule clearly states that both conditions must be fulfilled in order to free 
the carrier from its obligation to pay compensation. The following figure presents the 
four possible combinations, together with their outcome.
NO COMPENSATION
(combination 1)
 COMPENSATION
(combination 2)
 COMPENSATION
(combination 3)
 COMPENSATION
(combination 4)
The replacement ight
departs NO MORE THAN ONE
HOUR BEFORE the scheduled
time of departure
The replacement ight
departs MORE THAN ONE
HOUR BEFORE the scheduled
time of departure
The replacement ight
departs NO MORE THAN ONE
HOUR BEFORE the scheduled
time of departure
The replacement ight
departs MORE THAN ONE
HOUR BEFORE the scheduled
time of departure
The replacement ight
arrives LESS THAN TWO
HOURS AFTER the scheduled
time of arrival
The replacement ight
arrives TWO HOURS OR
MORE AFTER the scheduled
time of arrival
The replacement ight
arrives TWO HOURS OR
MORE AFTER the scheduled
time of arrival
The replacement ight
arrives LESS THAN TWO
HOURS AFTER the scheduled
time of arrival
The Court adds the limit of one hour (departing before the scheduled time of depar‑
ture) to the limit of two hours (arriving after the scheduled time of arrival) to make 
the sum “one hour + two hours = three hours”. The outcome of this sum (three hours) 
is taken as a basis to compare the situation of (a) passengers whose flight is delayed 
with the situation of (b) passengers whose flight is cancelled who are only informed 
about the cancellation on arrival at the airport (but fortunately can take a replacement 
flight later on). According to the APRR, the passengers in situation (b) are entitled 
to compensation if they suffer three hours’ loss of time, whereas the passengers of a 
flight with three hours’ delay, situation (a), are not. The Court is committed to equal 
treatment in equal (or comparable) situations, and therefore decides that passengers 
whose flight is delayed for three hours must also receive financial compensation (as 
described in article 7).
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However, the basis of three hours on which the Court builds its argument is not 
sound. The Court probably overlooked combinations 3 and 4 (see previous figure). 
An example of combination 3 is the situation of passengers whose flight is cancelled 
and who are only informed about the cancellation on arrival at the airport, and are 
offered a replacement flight that departs at the same time (as the cancelled flight) but 
arrives two hours after the scheduled time of arrival (of the cancelled flight). These 
passengers must also be entitled to compensation, according to the APRR. However, 
these passengers’ loss of time was only two hours. The basis for the comparison should 
be, as inferred by this example, two hours. If not – and according to the logic of the 
Court – unequal treatment will exist between the passengers in this example (a can‑
celled flight and two hours’ loss of time) and the passengers whose flight was delayed 
for two hours.
One example to illustrate combination 4 is that of passengers whose flight is can‑
celled and who are informed for the first time about the cancellation on arrival at the 
airport, and are offered a replacement flight that departs one hour and one minute before 
the scheduled time of departure (of the cancelled flight) but arrives at the same time (as 
the cancelled flight). These passengers must also be entitled to compensation, accord‑
ing to the APRR. However, these passengers’ loss of time was only one hour and one 
minute. The basis for the comparison should now only be, as inferred by this example, 
one hour and one minute. If not –  and according to the logic of the Court – unequal 
treatment will exist between the passengers in this example (a cancelled flight and one 
hour and one minute’s loss of time) and the passengers whose flight was delayed for 
one hour and one minute.
A second example to illustrate combination 4 is the situation of passengers whose 
flight is cancelled and who are only informed about the cancellation on arrival at the 
airport, and are offered a replacement flight that departs one hour and one minute before 
the scheduled time of departure (of the cancelled flight) and arrives exactly one hour and 
one minute before the scheduled time of arrival (of the cancelled flight), due to the same 
itinerary. Several questions arise: Can this be considered as a loss of time? If so (ratio: 
the passengers concerned had to depart one hour and one minute earlier), how do 
these passengers relate to passengers whose flight was delayed for one hour and one 
minute? Are these passengers, whose flight was delayed for one hour and one minute, 
also entitled to compensation under article 7? If not (ratio: the passengers concerned 
had to depart one hour and one minute earlier, but also gained one hour and one min‑
ute at the point of arrival), do passengers whose flight is cancelled and who are only 
informed about the cancellation on arrival at the airport, and are offered a replacement 
flight that departs one hour and one minute before the scheduled time of departure and 
arrives exactly one hour and one minute before the scheduled time of arrival still have 
the right to compensation (while not suffering any loss of time)? If this last question is 
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answered in the affirmative: How do these passengers relate to passengers whose flight 
was delayed for zero hours? Are these latter passengers (who also did not suffer a loss of 
time) also entitled to compensation?
So, what is the correct basis for comparison? What are the time limits? Are there 
limits? When are passengers treated equally? How many hours’ delay must a passenger 
suffer in order to be entitled to compensation? Here are the possible options:
Zero hours: This option is the result of the reasoning (as meant in combination 4’s 
second example) which assumes that passengers whose flight is cancelled and who 
are only informed about the cancellation on arrival at the airport, and are offered 
a replacement flight that departs one hour and one minute before the scheduled 
time of departure (of the cancelled flight) and arrives exactly one hour and one 
minute before the scheduled time of arrival (of the cancelled flight) do not suffer 
a loss of time. In other words, these passengers (whose flight has been cancelled) 
still have the right to compensation without suffering a loss of time. In the name 
of equal treatment, passengers whose flight is delayed and who did not suffer a loss 
of time should also be entitled to compensation. Giving passengers of “a delayed 
flight without a delay”, which is a perfectly normally executed flight, the right 
to compensation is, however, illogical. This will not have been the legislators’ 
intention. The zero hours option is therefore untenable. Moreover, the situation 
of a passenger whose itinerary took place one hour and one minute earlier in time 
is different from that of a passenger whose itinerary was perfectly normally exe‑
cuted. 
One hour: The underlying idea for this limit has already been explained in combi‑
nation 4’s first example (departing one hour and one minute before the cancelled 
flight’s scheduled time of departure, but arriving at the same time as the cancelled 
flight’s scheduled time of arrival).
Two hours: The reasoning for this limit has already been explained in the example 
from combination 3 (departing at the same time as the cancelled flight’s scheduled 
time of departure, but arriving two hours after the cancelled flight’s scheduled time 
of arrival). Note that because the basis of two hours is also used in other places in the 
APRR, 48 this option would increase its consistency. The remaining unequal treat‑
ment, as revealed by the two examples from combination 4 (respectively one hour’s 
and zero hours’ loss of time, which create the right to compensation), can be solved. 
Stating that passengers who are informed of the cancellation less than seven days 
before the scheduled time of departure and are offered re‑ routing (that allows them 
to depart no more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure and to 
reach their final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival) 
 48 See articles 6(1)(a) and 7(2)(a).
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do not have the right to compensation unless they suffer a minimum of two hours’ 
loss of time, could be a reasonable solution – although it is contrary to the letter of 
article 5(1)(c)(iii). One could say that if article 5(1)(c)(iii) were not interpreted in 
this way, there would be unequal treatment between the passengers whose flight 
is cancelled (who were offered re‑ routing) and passengers whose flight is delayed. 
Whereas the first category of passengers gain rights after losing one hour or zero 
hours of time (cf. the two examples from combination 4), passengers in the second 
category, whose flight is delayed, only gain rights under the APRR when they suf‑
fer a minimum of two hours’ loss of time. 49 50 This is the Sturgeon equal treatment 
reasoning but in the opposite direction. Instead of expanding air passengers’ rights 
in the name of equal treatment, this is restricting air passengers’ rights for the sake 
of equal treatment.
Three hours: This is the limit that the C.J.E.U. applies in its jurisprudence. Unfor‑
tunately, unequal treatment may occur when using this limit. The following figure 
illustrates the C.J.E.U.’s calculation method.
Article 5(1)(c)(iii)
C.J.E.U.
3 hours
2 hours1 hour
3. – Reduced compensation?
Reduced compensation by 50% –  When passengers are offered re‑ routing to their 
final destination on an alternative flight, article 7(2) prescribes that the operating air 
carrier may reduce the compensation by 50% if the arrival time of the alternative 
flight does not exceed the scheduled arrival time of the flight originally booked by 
certain time limits (proportional to the distance of the flight). The table below gives 
a summary.
 49 Meals and refreshments in a reasonable proportion to the waiting time; and two telephone calls, telex 
or fax messages, or emails (articles 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(i) juncto articles 9(1)(a) and (2)).
 50 This interpretation could be analogously applied to article 5(1)(c)(ii).
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Flights
Maximum number of hours 
by which the alternative 
flight can exceed the 
scheduled time of arrival (of 
the flight originally booked)
Compensation 
to be paid by 
the air carrier 
(after 50% 
reduction)
50% reduction 
rule A
All flights of 
1 500 kilometres or less 2 hours EUR 125
50% reduction 
rule B
All intra‑ Community 
flights of more than 
1 500 kilometres
All other flights 
between 1 500 and 
3 500 kilometres
3 hours
3 hours
EUR 200
EUR 200
50% reduction 
rule C
All flights not falling under 
50% reduction rule A or B 4 hours EUR 300
To decide whether or not the 50% reduction has to be applied, article 7(2) only 
takes into account the time of arrival. This is unfortunate. Example 1: Six days before 
the scheduled time of departure, passenger X is informed about the cancellation of 
his flight. The replacement flight departs four hours before the cancelled flight’s 
scheduled time of departure but arrives at the same time as the cancelled flight’s 
scheduled time of arrival (due to the route taking four hours longer). Because of the 
wording of article 7(2), which only takes into account the time of arrival, the air 
carrier may reduce the compensation by 50% (since there is no difference in time of 
arrival at all). Example 2: Six days before the scheduled time of departure, passenger 
Y is informed about the cancellation of his flight (of 1 500 kilometres or less). The 
replacement flight, with exactly the same itinerary, arrives two hours and five min‑
utes after the cancelled flight’s scheduled time of arrival. Because of the wording of 
article 7(2), which only takes into account the time of arrival, the air carrier cannot 
reduce the compensation by 50% (since the time of arrival exceeds the scheduled 
arrival time of the flight originally booked by two hours). Passenger Y (whose jour‑
ney was two hours and five minutes longer than initially planned) is entitled to the 
full compensation, in contrast to passenger X from the first example (whose journey 
was four hours longer than initially planned), who is only entitled to 50% of the 
compensation.
Even though article 7(2) refers only to instances where passengers are re- routed, the 
Court found in its Sturgeon case that the reduction in compensation is dependent solely 
on the delay to which passengers are subject, so that nothing precludes the application 
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mutatis mutandis of that provision to compensation paid to passengers whose flights are 
delayed. 51 This statement must be given a warm welcome, because it gives airlines an 
incentive to reach the passenger’s destination as soon as possible.
However, problems arise when we consider the three hour time limit that the Court 
applies. First, 50% reduction rule A can never be applied. Although the operating air 
carrier may reduce the compensation by 50% when the replacement flight does not 
exceed the scheduled time of arrival by two hours, passengers whose flight is delayed 
are only entitled to compensation (according to the Court) if they suffer a loss of time 
equal to or in excess of three hours. Second, 50% reduction rule B is more inapplicable 
than applicable. Reduction rule B can only be applied when passengers arrive exactly 
three hours after the scheduled time of arrival. In the opinion of the Court, passengers 
whose flight is delayed are only entitled to compensation if they suffer a loss of time 
equal to or in excess of three hours. According to the APRR, however, an air carrier may 
only reduce the compensation by 50% when the replacement flight does not exceed the 
scheduled time of arrival by three hours. 52 Once again we must note that the time limit 
of three hours (for passengers of delayed flights to be entitled to compensation) creates 
problems of unequal treatment.
e. – sturgeon’s result
1. – Preliminary ruling
Dictum – The C.J.E.U.’s answer to the question that was referred for a preliminary 
ruling:
“Articles 5, 6 and 7 [APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose 
flights are delayed may be treated, for the purposes of the application of the right 
to compensation, as passengers whose flights are cancelled and they may thus rely 
on the right to compensation laid down in article 7 [APRR] where they suffer, on 
account of a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is, 
where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time 
originally scheduled by the air carrier. Such a delay does not, however, entitle pas‑
sengers to compensation if the air carrier can prove that the long delay was caused by 
extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasona‑
ble measures had been taken, namely circumstances beyond the actual control of the 
air carrier” (C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, dictum 2).
 51 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 63.
 52 Purely theoretically, the time slot wherein reduction rule B can be applied is one yoctosecond (a 
septillionth (short scale) or a quadrillionth (long scale) of a second; the value in scientific notation is 
1.0 × 10‑24).
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The question remains as to why the Court also took the difficult detour via Recital 
15 Preamble APRR, which has drawn the concept “long delay” into the discussion, 
instead of remaining focused on avoiding unequal treatment.
2. – Successors and repercussions
Remaining gaps/newly created gaps – It has not been easy to put the Sturgeon ruling 
into practice. The APRR was not designed to cope with financial compensation for 
passengers whose flight is delayed. As a result, many questions arose on how to com‑
bine (and interpret) the articles concerning “compensation” with those about “delay”. 
These questions, together with a number of air carriers who were not (financially) 
amused with the Sturgeon ruling, resulted in a flood of requests to the C.J.E.U. for a 
preliminary ruling.
Departure time –  When the operating air carrier reasonably expects a flight to be 
delayed beyond its scheduled time of departure for two, three, four hours or more 
(depending on the distance of the flight), the carrier must, according to the APRR, 
provide the passengers concerned with certain measures of assistance and care. 53 The 
question is whether or not these conditions (a delay of two, three, four hours or more 
beyond the scheduled time of departure) also apply to the right to financial compen‑
sation for passengers whose flight is delayed, as introduced by the C.J.E.U. in its Stur-
geon case. In other words, “Does a passenger have a right to compensation under arti‑
cle 7 [APRR] in the case where departure of his flight was delayed for a period which 
is below the limits specified in article 6(1) [APRR], but arrival at the final destination 
was at least three hours later than the scheduled arrival time?” 54 In the Air France case 
(C‑ 11/11), the Court gave this last question an affirmative answer. 55
Connecting flights – If an outward (or return) journey consists of different flights, it 
is clear that when a preceding flight suffers a delay this has an impact on the follow‑
ing flight. Unfortunately, no one knew how to deal with such situations. In the case 
C‑ 11/11 (Air France), for example, Mrs Folkerts’ first flight was delayed for approx‑
imately two and a half hours beyond the scheduled departure time. Because of this 
delay she missed her connection with the following flight and arrived (after re‑ booking 
to a later flight) at her final destination 11 hours after the originally scheduled arrival 
time. 56 Other cases worth mentioning (because they are slightly different) are Cacha-
 53 See article 6 juncto articles 8(1)(a) and 9.
 54 C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 11/11 (Air France), para. 24, question 2.
 55 See C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 11/11 (Air France), dictum. See also C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 436/11 (Schüssl-
bauer); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 437/11 (Schauβ); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 594/11 (Becker); C.J.E.U., Case 
C‑ 212/12 (Butz).
 56 The C.J.E.U. decided that “Article 7 [APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that compensation is 
payable, on the basis of that article, to a passenger on directly connecting flights who has been delayed 
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feiro (C‑ 321/11) and Nuno Esteves Coelho dos Santos (C‑ 365/11). In the Cachafeiro case, 
the passengers concerned arrived just in time for their connecting flight (after a delay 
of one hour and twenty‑ five minutes by the preceding flight). However, in anticipa‑
tion that that delay would result in these two passengers missing their connection, the 
airline cancelled their boarding cards for the connecting flight and allocated their seats 
to other passengers. As a result, the applicants in the Cachafeiro case reached their final 
destination 27 hours late. 57 In the Nuno Esteves Coelho dos Santos case (C‑ 365/11), the 
preceding flight was not delayed; the passenger’s journey started on time at the place 
of departure, but it was subsequently delayed at the stop‑ over airport for three hours 
and fifty‑ five minutes (before taking off again). The flight arrived at the final destina‑
tion with the said delay of three hours and fifty‑ five minutes. 58
Regarding the “connection” between the outward and return flight as a whole, the 
Emirates Airlines case (C‑ 173/07) made it clear that the outward and return flight (or 
journey) cannot be regarded as “non‑ independent parts of a single flight”. 59  60
Arrival time – Because passengers whose flight is delayed may rely on the right to 
compensation where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the 
arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier, it is important to know how to 
measure this delay. What time is relevant for the term “time of arrival”? Is it: (a) the 
time that the aircraft lands on the runway (“touchdown”); (b) the time that the aircraft 
reaches its parking position and the parking brakes are engaged or the chocks have 
been applied (“in‑ block time”); (c) the time that the aircraft door is opened; or (d) a 
time defined by the parties in the context of party autonomy? The C.J.E.U. decided 
that “Articles 2, 5 and 7 [APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of 
at departure for a period below the limits specified in article 6 of that regulation, but has arrived at 
the final destination at least three hours later than the scheduled arrival time, given that the com‑
pensation in question is not conditional upon there having been a delay at departure and, thus, upon 
the conditions set out in article 6 having been met” (C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 11/11 (Air France), dictum).
 57 The C.J.E.U. decided that “Article 2(j) read in conjunction with article 3(2) [APRR], must be inter‑
preted as meaning that the concept of ‘denied boarding’ includes a situation where, in the context 
of a single contract of carriage involving a number of reservations on immediately connecting flights 
and a single check‑ in, an air carrier denies boarding to some passengers on the ground that the first 
flight included in their reservation has been subject to a delay attributable to that carrier and the latter 
mistakenly expected those passengers not to arrive in time to board the second flight” (C.J.E.U., 
Case C‑ 321/11 (Cachafeiro), dictum).
 58 By order of 16 January 2012, received at the Court Registry on 23 January 2012, the Tribunal de 
Pequena Instância Cível de Lisboa informed the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a pre‑
liminary ruling.
 59 See also C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 173/07 (Emirates Airlines), para. 16, 47 and dictum.
 60 As regards the interpretation of the concept of “flight” and how to interpret each part of a flight (or 
journey) that is composed of different parts (for example, an outward flight from A, via B, to C), 
see also R. van der Bruggen, “European air passenger rights: the concept of ‘flight’”, EUVR, 2014, 
No 4, 233‑249.
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‘arrival time’, which is used to determine the length of the delay to which passengers 
on a flight have been subject, refers to the time at which at least one of the doors of 
the aircraft is opened, the assumption being that, at that moment, the passengers are 
permitted to leave the aircraft”. 61
Montreal Convention 62 – The Montreal Convention (MC) is one of the most important 
multilateral regulations of international carriage by air. It was created to be a new, 
modern and most of all unified instrument for liability in international carriage by 
air. Essential issues were established in order to provide the global air transportation 
industry and its customers with a common liability standard. 63 One of the issues reg‑
ulated is the carrier’s liability for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air (of 
passengers, baggage or cargo). 64
To date, 110  nations worldwide and the EU itself, as a whole, have ratified the 
MC. 65 By ratifying the MC, the EU made it an integral part of the EU Community 
legal order. Agreements concluded by the EU are binding on its institutions and on its 
Member States. 66
Even before the APRR’s entry into force there was a request for a preliminary ruling 
regarding how to deal with these two sets of rules (the MC rules versus the APRR 
rules). 67 Since the Sturgeon case, which implemented financial compensation for pas‑
sengers in the event of a delayed flight, requests for a preliminary ruling have rapidly 
increased. The questions referred to the C.J.E.U. ranged from “please explain (the 
coherence between) both sets of rules (and the Sturgeon ruling)” to “please revoke 
the Sturgeon ruling” to “please decide whether parts of the APRR are void or inva‑
lid (on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the MC)”. 68 In the joined cases 
 Nelson (C‑581/10) and TUI Travel (C‑ 629/10), most of these questions (re)appeared 
together. Perhaps hoping to settle this once and for all, the C.J.E.U. took the oppor‑
 61 C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 452/13 (Germanwings), para. 11 and dictum.
 62 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (signed in Montreal 
on 28 May 1999).
 63 E. Giemulla and R. Schmid (eds), Montreal Convention, general section 4.1, preface.
 64 Articles 17‑37 MC comprise Chapter III thereof, entitled “Liability of the carrier and extent of com‑
pensation for damage”.
 65 For status of ratification see http://icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl99_EN.pdf.
 66 Article 216(2) TFEU.
 67 C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 344/04 (International Air Transport Association). See also (a few years later) 
C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 173/07 (Emirates Airlines), para. 42‑46.
 68 See C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 549/07 (Wallentin- Hermann); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 204/08 (Rehder); C.J.E.U., 
Case C‑ 83/10 (Sousa Rodríguez); C.J.E.U., Joined Cases C‑ 581/10 (Nelson) and C‑ 629/10 (TUI 
Travel); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 12/11 (McDonagh); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 139/11 (Cuadrench Moré); C.J.E.U., 
Case C‑ 255/11 (Büsch); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 315/11 (van de Ven); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 413/11 (German 
Wings); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 150/12 (Brännström); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 227/12 (Koninklijke Luchtvaart 
Maatschappij).
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tunity to answer these questions (some of them for a second time). The APRR’s valid‑
ity and the Sturgeon interpretation were expressis verbis confirmed. Unfortunately, 
Sturgeon’s calculation method (for article 5(1)(c)(iii)’s limits) was also confirmed. 69  70
Revision of the APRR –  On 13  March 2013 the European Commission proposed a 
regulation for amending the APRR. 71 After holding a public consultation 72 and con‑
ference, 73 the Commission realised that many stakeholders had complaints. The con‑
sumer and passenger representatives mainly focused on poor compliance and inad‑
equate enforcement, especially with regard to financial compensation in the case of 
delay. Airlines and their associations mainly considered that the financial cost of the 
APRR is excessive, and in particular that airlines face unlimited liability for incidents 
that are not their fault (for example, the volcanic ash‑ cloud crisis in April 2010). The 
airlines heavily criticised the consequences of the Sturgeon judgment as the cause of 
these excessive costs. 74
As a result, the Proposal explicitly introduces the right to compensation in the case 
of long delays, as announced by the C.J.E.U. in its Sturgeon case, into the text of the 
APRR. However, to avoid an increase in cancellations (which are in general more 
inconvenient to passengers) and to take account of the financial impact on the sec‑
tor, the European Commission proposed that the time threshold after which the right 
to compensation arises should be increased from three to five hours for all journeys 
within the EU. While a single threshold is proposed for the EU, for journeys to/from 
third countries the threshold will be made dependent upon the journey’s distance. 75
As mentioned by the Commission, 76 it is clear that the Sturgeon case had a decisive 
impact on the APRR.
 69 See C.J.E.U., Joined Cases C‑ 581/10 (Nelson) and C‑ 629/10 (TUI Travel), para. 31.
 70 The area of tension between the APRR and the MC will not be further discussed in this paper. The 
matter will be discussed in more detail in a following publication (see www.renzovanderbruggen.be 
for more information).
 71 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event 
of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on 
air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air, COM(2013) 130 
final. Hereinafter “Proposal”.
 72 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/passengers/consultations/2012‑03‑11‑ apr_en.htm.
 73 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/passengers/events/2012‑05‑30‑ stakeholder‑ conference_
en.htm.
 74 See section 2.1 of the Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum.
 75 See section 3.3.1.1, bullet 2 of the Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum; Recital 11 of the Propo‑
sal’s Preamble; Article 1(5) of the Proposal (Article 6(2) of the amended APRR).
 76 See section 1.2, para. 7 of the Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum.
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III. – The Sousa Rodríguez case:  
a delayed cancellation or a cancelled delay?
This judgment is the answer to a twofold reference for a preliminary ruling. 77 First, 
the judge at the Juzgado de lo Mercantil No 1 de Pontevedra (Spain) wanted to know if 
the concept “cancellation”, defined in article 2(l), must be interpreted as meaning only 
the failure of the flight to depart as planned or if it must also be interpreted as meaning 
any circumstance as a result of which the flight on which places are reserved takes off 
but fails to reach its destination, including the case in which a flight is forced to return 
to the airport of departure for technical reasons. Second, the judge wanted clarifica‑
tion about the concept “further compensation”, as mentioned in article 12. The latter 
will not be discussed in this paper. 78
a. – facts
The Pato Rodríguez family, 79 the López Sousa family 80 and Rodrigo Manuel Puga 
Lueiro were booked on a flight from the Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (France) 
to the Vigo‑ Peinador Airport (Spain) on 25 September 2008, scheduled to depart at 
19.40. A few minutes after the departure, the pilot decided to return to Paris Charles 
de Gaulle Airport because of a technical problem with the aircraft.
The Pato Rodríguez family was re‑ routed to a flight from Paris Orly Airport (France) 
to Oporto Airport (Portugal), which departed on 26 September 2008 at 07.05. As 
a result, they departed 11 hours and 25 minutes later than planned and had to pay 
EUR 170 to travel from Oporto to Vigo by taxi.
Air France re‑ booked the López Sousa family on the Paris (Orly) to Vigo flight that 
was scheduled to arrive on 26 September 2008 at 19.40. This family departed 24 hours 
later than planned and received no assistance during this time.
 77 See also C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez case, para. 24; Opinion AG Sharpston 28 June 2011 (Sousa Rodrí-
guez case), para. 25.
 78 Concerning “further compensation”, the C.J.E.U. decided that “The meaning of ‘further compensa‑
tion’, used in article 12 [APRR], must be interpreted to the effect that it allows the national court 
to award compensation, under the conditions provided for by the [Montreal] Convention […] or 
national law, for damage, including non‑ material damage, arising from breach of a contract of car‑
riage by air. On the other hand, that meaning of ‘further compensation’ may not be the legal basis 
for the national court to order an air carrier to reimburse to passengers whose flight has been delayed 
or cancelled the expenses the latter have had to incur because of the failure of that carrier to fulfil its 
obligations to assist and provide care under article 8 and article 9 [APRR]” (C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez 
case, dictum 2).
 79 María del Mar Pato Barreiro, Luis Ángel Rodríguez González and their 4‑ year‑ old daughter Yaiza 
Pato Rodríguez.
 80 Aurora Sousa Rodríguez, Manuel López Alonso and their 6‑ year‑ old son Yago López Sousa.
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Rodrigo Manuel Puga Lueiro was offered a seat on the Paris‑ Bilbao‑ Vigo flight on 
the morning of 26 September 2008. He was the only one to be offered assistance or 
overnight hotel accommodation by Air France. The Pato Rodríguez family and the 
López Sousa family had to sleep in another terminal of Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport 
as the terminal from which their flight was due to depart, closed at midnight.
The (seven) applicants brought an action against Air France before the referring 
court in which they alleged a breach of their contracts of carriage by air. They each 
claimed EUR 250 under article 7. The Pato Rodríguez family claimed an additional 
EUR 170 to cover the cost of the taxi from Oporto to Vigo, and the López Sousa fam‑
ily claimed expenses of EUR 20,50 for each meal taken in the airport and EUR 23,20 
for an additional day in boarding kennels for their dog. By way of non‑ material dam‑
ages, the Pato Rodríguez family and the López Sousa family sought a further sum of 
EUR 650, and Mr Puga Lueiro claimed EUR 300 under that heading.
b. – itinerary and original planning
Key question – The answer to the question of whether or not a flight must be consid‑
ered “cancelled” also answers the question of whether or not the passengers are enti‑
tled to the above mentioned rights (reimbursement or re‑ routing; meals and refresh‑
ments, two telephone calls, if necessary hotel accommodation with transportation; 
EUR 250‑600 compensation). 81
From “cancellation” to “flight” to “itinerary” to “cancellation” – The C.J.E.U. started its 
reasoning by quoting the APRR’s definition of “cancellation”: “the non‑ operation of 
a flight which was previously planned and on which at least one place was reserved” 
(article 2(l)). Before being able to determine the meaning of “cancellation”, the Court 
required that the meaning of “flight” must first be specified. It therefore referred to 
the Emirates Airlines case. 82 According to the Court, in the Emirates Airlines case “a flight 
consists, in essence, of an air transport operation, being as it were a unit of such trans‑
port, performed by an air carrier which fixes its itinerary”. 83  84 The concept of “itiner‑
ary”, in turn, was later (in the Sturgeon case) described as “an essential element of the 
flight, as the flight is operated in accordance with the carrier’s pre- arranged planning”. 85 After 
looking at its own interpretations, the Court concluded that as the term “itinerary” 
means the journey to be made by an aeroplane from the airport of departure to the 
airport of arrival according to a fixed schedule, it follows that, for a flight to be con‑
 81 See supra, section I., A.
 82 C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez case, para. 26‑27.
 83 See C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 173/07 (Emirates Airlines), para. 40.
 84 For the interpretation on the concept of “flight”, see also R. van der Bruggen, “European air passen‑
ger rights: the concept of ‘flight’”, EUVR, 2014, No 4, 233‑249.
 85 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 30.
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sidered to have been operated, it is not enough that the aeroplane left in accordance 
with the scheduled itinerary, but it must also have reached its destination as appearing 
in the said itinerary. 86 The Court decided, because of this reasoning, that the flight 
initially booked by the seven applicants (from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport to Vigo‑ 
Peinador Airport) has to be considered “cancelled”.
Regardless of the correct outcome in this case, the reasoning behind it made a need‑
less detour. It is not because A (“cancellation”) is explained by B (“flight”) and B is 
explained by C (“scheduled itinerary”), that C explains A. For example, if an air carrier 
decides to change the flying route, to skip or to insert an intermediate landing, etc., 
these flights can hardly be considered “cancelled”. 87 In other words, the flight cannot 
automatically be considered “cancelled” because the itinerary is different to the one 
that was originally planned.
The “execution criterion” – The C.J.E.U.’s “itinerary criterion”, together with its allied 
question “Is the itinerary different from the one that was originally planned?”, is hard to 
put in practice. Because of its yes‑ or‑ no character, the itinerary question is inflexible. 
Only two answers are possible. The open question “how is the flight executed?” functions 
better. It can generate multiple answers, not only “yes” or “no”. For example, in the 
event of a change to the flying route, or the omission or insertion of an intermediate 
landing, the flight’s execution can be described as delayed, bad, insufficient, unsafe, 
etc., or even not executed at all. Instead of focusing on a fictional situation (the origi‑
nal planning), the analysis can be based in reality (how the flight is executed).
The “execution criterion” not only generates more answers, but also the consequences 
of all these possible answers can be more nuanced – in contrast to the “itinerary cri‑
terion”. For example, when a flying route is changed, or an intermediate landing is 
skipped or inserted, this does not mean that the consequence has to be “not executed” 
(or “cancelled”). Due to its flexible character, the “execution criterion” would reflect 
more accurately the reality of the situation – which should make it easier to put into 
practice, or at least has the potential to be more workable.
c. – replacement
In the Sousa Rodríguez case, the Court repeats its consideration from the Sturgeon 
case:
“It is possible, as a rule, to conclude that there is a cancellation where the delayed 
flight for which the booking was made is ‘rolled over’ onto another flight, that is to 
say, where the planning for the original flight is abandoned and the passengers from 
 86 C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez case, para. 28.
 87 These examples will be elucidated throughout this paper.
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that flight join passengers on a flight which was also planned but independently of the 
flight for which the passengers so transferred had made their bookings” (C.J.E.U., 
Sousa Rodríguez case, paragraph 30; C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, paragraph 36).
The detour via the concept of “planning” or “itinerary” (of the original flight) also 
creates problems in the context of replacement flights.
The replaced cancellation – Example: a planned flight is replaced by another flight; 
the replacement flight departs and arrives on time and the passengers are treated in 
exactly the same way as the flight that was originally planned. In this example it is hard 
to defend labelling this flight as cancelled. It would not be fair for the passengers in 
this example to obtain the rights of passengers whose flight has been cancelled. Giving 
these passengers the right to EUR 250‑600 compensation would be illogical. 88 Putting 
a replacement flight on a par with a cancelled flight, therefore, is not recommended.
The replaced delay – Example: an air carrier notices in advance that flight (A), which 
has to make an intermediate landing, is going to experience too great a delay; the 
passengers who were meant to be picked up by that flight (A) at the intermediate land‑
ing are therefore picked up by a “replacement” flight (B); eventually, the passengers 
picked up by aeroplane (B) depart and arrive without any delay. Questions: Should 
this passenger‑ friendly solution qualify as a “cancelled” flight because the delayed 
flight for which the booking was made is “rolled over” onto another flight? And/or 
because the planning for the original flight has been abandoned? And/or because the 
passengers from that flight join passengers on a flight that was also pre‑ planned (but 
independently of the flight for which the passengers so transferred had made their 
bookings)? Looking only at the originally planned flight (A) and its delay, instead of 
looking at replacement flight (B)’s reality, would provide air carriers with the wrong 
incentives. Carriers would not be stimulated to eliminate flight (A)’s delay if flight (B) 
is considered as not being “the originally planned flight” or not being “the flight for 
which the booking was made”. Despite the air carrier’s efforts to assist its customers, 
passengers on replacement flight (B) would be entitled to the same rights as passengers 
whose flight has been cancelled. Note that without the carrier’s efforts, the passen‑
gers’ situation would have been worse. It is therefore better not to automatically put a 
replacement flight on a par with a cancelled flight.
The perfect replacement –  As has been shown by the examples, the criterion that 
focuses on the itinerary or planning of the (original) flight is also unsustainable for 
replacement flights. The “execution criterion” (how is the flight executed) works better. 
In cases where a planned flight is replaced by another that treats the passengers con‑
cerned in exactly the same way (and departs and arrives at exactly the same time), it is 
easy to state that the flight is executed in a regular, normal way. It seems logical that 
 88 See in the same sense also Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 34 and 70.
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these passengers are not entitled to extra rights; although this replacement flight is not 
the one originally planned, passengers will not be able to tell the difference.
The delayed replacement –  The question may arise as to what happens when the 
replacement flight itself is delayed. To hypothesise, if a replacement flight is faced 
with a 10 minute delay it seems logical that entitling the passengers concerned to the 
rights of passengers whose flight is cancelled is excessive. However, if the replacement 
flight were to be delayed for 24 hours then according these passengers the same rights 
as passengers of cancelled flights does not seem disproportionate, and the qualification 
“cancelled” would seem to be in order.
The key is to know where to draw the line. How long is a “reasonable” delay for pas‑
sengers on a replacement flight? How many hours’ delay must a replacement flight expe‑
rience before it should be (re‑ )classified as “cancelled”? 89 If no lines were drawn there 
would be no “cancellations”, only “delays” (even if the delay is, for example, 12 days).
Article 5(1)(c)(iii) seems to answer the first question: if passengers are informed of 
the cancellation less than seven days before the scheduled time of departure and are 
offered re‑ routing (a replacement flight), allowing them to depart no more than one hour 
before the scheduled time of departure and to reach their final destination less than two 
hours after the scheduled time of arrival, the passengers concerned do not have the right 
to compensation. This article considers this specific timeframe to be decisive. Within 
this timeframe, the APRR does not find it reasonable to give the passengers concerned 
EUR 250‑600 compensation. In other words, the APRR considers slight changes in 
time of departure and/or arrival (which fit in the timeframe) to be normal and regular. 
Thus, we can derive from article 5(1)(c)(iii) the limits for a “normally executed replace‑
ment flight”. In cases where a replacement flight crosses these “reasonable” time limits, 
it can be considered a badly (or abnormally) executed replacement flight.
This badly executed replacement flight can also be assessed using the “execution cri‑
terion”. We can ask ourselves how this replacement flight is executed. For example, the 
flight can be considered to have been executed, but with a delay. Thus, it is also pos‑
sible to apply the regime from article 6 for delays of originally planned flights (meals, 
refreshments, hotel accommodation, etc.) to the delayed replacement flight.
The cancelled replacement – The answer to the question “how many hours must a replace‑
ment flight be delayed before it can be considered to be cancelled?” can be found in the 
previously mentioned regime for delays of originally planned flights (article 6). This arti‑
cle systematically builds up the passenger’s rights in proportion to the delay they have 
suffered: from meals and refreshments (when the delay is two hours or more for flights of 
 89 Although AG Sharpston concludes that it is impossible to identify exactly what period of time must 
elapse before a delay becomes a cancellation, see also Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon 
case), para. 80‑95.
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1 500 kilometers or less), to hotel accommodation (when the expected time of departure 
is at least the next day), to full reimbursement of the ticket (when the delay is at least five 
hours). As has already been mentioned, EUR 250‑600 compensation is not laid down in 
the APRR in the event of delay. However, the C.J.E.U. decided in the Sturgeon case that 
passengers whose flight is delayed and who suffer a loss of time equal to or in excess of 
three hours are also entitled to this financial compensation. 90 When we combine the Stur‑
geon decision with article 6 we must conclude that the passenger of a delayed replace‑
ment flight who suffers at least five hours’ delay can de facto be put on a par with the 
passenger of a cancelled flight. In other words, when a replacement flight is delayed for at 
least five hours, it is equated with a cancelled flight. Once more, the way a flight has been 
executed is the decisive factor, not the itinerary, nor the original planning.
The following table clarifies why a passenger whose replacement flight is delayed 
and who suffers at least five hours’ delay is, due to the Sturgeon case, de facto put on a 
par with a passenger whose flight has been cancelled.
Right to reimbursement Right to compensation
Passenger of a cancelled 
flight
YES
(Basis: article 5(1)(a) juncto
article 8(1)(a))
YES
(Basis: article 5(1)(c) juncto
article 7)
Passenger of a delayed 
(replacement) flight 
who suffers at least 
5 hours’ delay
YES
(Basis: article 6(1)(iii) juncto
article 8(1)(a))
YES
(Basis: the Sturgeon case)
Three regimes: normal, delayed or cancelled –  A replacement flight must be tested 
against the above‑ mentioned limits. First, we must check whether the replacement 
flight departs “no more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure and 
[reaches the passenger’s] final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time 
of arrival” (article 5(1)(c)(iii)). If the replacement flight finds itself within this time‑
frame it must be considered as a “normally” executed flight. Second, if the limit of two 
hours’ delay is breached, the same regime must be applied as the one that applies to 
delays of originally planned flights (casu quo article 6). Third, if the delay goes beyond 
the five hours limit, the delayed replacement flight must be put on a par with a can‑
celled flight (due to the sum of article 6(1)(iii) and the Sturgeon case). In the latter case, 
the APRR’s cancellation regime (article 5) should be applied. The following scheme 
illustrates this double limit test.
 90 See C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, para. 40‑69.
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REPLACEMENT
ight
BEYOND Art.
5(1)(c)(iii)’s limits
( = departure more than
1 hour before the
scheduled time of
departure OR arrival 2
hours or more after the
scheduled time of
arrival )
ABOVE Art.
6(1)(iii)’s limit
( = delay is at least 
5 hours)
regime CANCELLED
ight
ABOVE Art. 6(1)(a), 
(b) or (c)’s limit
( = (a) delay is 2 hours 
or more in the case of
ights of 1 500 kilo-
metres or less; (b)
delay is 3 hours or more 
in the case of all intra-
Community ights of
more than 1 500 kilo-
metres and of all other ights 
of 1 500-3 500 kilometres; 
or (c) delay is 4 hours 
or more in the case 
of all ights
not falling under (a) or (b) ) 
BUT UNDER 
Art. 6(1)(iii)'s limit
( = delay is less than 5 hours )
regime DELAYED
ight
NORMAL ight
UNDER Art. 6(1)(a),
(b) or (c)’s limit
( = (a) delay is less than
2 hours in the case of
ights of 1 500
kilometres or less; (b)
delay is less than 3 hours
in the case of all intra-
Community ights of
more than 1 500
kilometres and of all
other ights of 1 500-
3 500 kilometres; or (c)
delay is less than 4 hours
in the case of all ights
not falling under (a) or
(b) )
WITHIN Art.
5(1)(c)(iii)’s limits
( = departure no more
than 1 hour before the
scheduled time of
departure AND arrival
less than 2 hours after
the scheduled time of
arrival )
The hypothesis in which the replacement flight departs more than one hour before 
the scheduled time of departure can also be included in this scheme. This hypothesis is 
beyond article 5(1)(c)(iii) APRR’s limits and is therefore considered as a flight that is 
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not normal, not reasonable or not correctly executed. In contrast with delayed flights, 
the APRR makes no provision for a regime that systematically increases a passen‑
ger’s rights in proportion to the amount of time a flight has been “advanced” (brought 
forward). Thus, in cases where a flight has been “advanced” only one limit must be 
checked, casu quo article 5(1)(c)(iii)’s limit. It’s all or nothing – only two regimes can 
be applied, there is no in between. If the “advancing” is within article 5(1)(c)(iii)’s 
timeframe (the replacement flight departs no more than one hour before the scheduled 
time of departure), the flight must be considered to be normally executed. If not (the 
replacement flight departs more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure), 
the regime for cancelled flights must be applied.
d. – other criteria
As has been mentioned, in the Sousa Rodríguez case the Court repeats its conclusion 
from the Sturgeon case:
“It is possible, as a rule, to conclude that there is a cancellation where the delayed 
flight for which the booking was made is ‘rolled over’ onto another flight, that is to 
say, where the planning for the original flight is abandoned and the passengers from 
that flight join passengers on a flight which was also planned but independently of the 
flight for which the passengers so transferred had made their bookings” (C.J.E.U., 
Sousa Rodríguez case, paragraph 30; C.J.E.U., Sturgeon case, paragraph 36).
The shortcomings in the C.J.E.U.’s “itinerary criterion” have already been pointed 
out in this paper. Unfortunately, other criteria that can be derived from this conclu‑
sion are also not free of defects.
Other passengers – Few or no arguments can be found to support the statement that 
the passengers in question have to join passengers on another flight in order for their 
initial flight to be considered cancelled. The question of whether or not there are 
other passengers on the flight the passengers from the initial flight join is irrelevant. 
We must take into account the way the flight is executed. When the passengers are trans‑
ported in exactly the same way as was originally booked (for example, on time, with a 
meal, in first class, etc.), it does not matter whether or not they have joined passengers 
on another flight. The transport contract has, in this example, been correctly executed 
whether or not there are other passengers on the flight they join.
Planned – The condition that the other flight (that the passengers have to join) has to 
be planned as well seems to be cast in the same mould. Does it matter whether or not 
the replacement flight was already planned, or was chartered by the air carrier later on 
(and thus not already planned)? When passengers are transported in the same way, the 
transport contract is executed correctly. It is hard to find a convincing argument as to 
why passengers would have the right to EUR 250‑600 compensation just because their 
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aeroplane was chartered at the last moment (and this was not part of the original plan‑
ning).
Reason to return to the airport of departure – The Court, Advocate General Sharpston 
and the European Commission all, correctly, agree that the reason for the return to 
the airport of departure is irrelevant when determining whether a flight is cancelled or 
not. The reason is only relevant when determining whether it is “caused by extraor‑
dinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable meas‑
ures had been taken” (article 5(3)), in which case no compensation will be due. 91 The 
air carrier’s other obligations (reimbursement or re‑ routing; meals and refreshments; 
two telephone calls, telex or fax messages, or emails; possible hotel accommodation 
and transport between the airport and place of accommodation) remain in full force. 
The “extraordinary circumstances” thus have no impact on these other obligations.
Fly back – Not only can the reason why it had to fly back not be used as a criterion, but 
also the fact itself that the aeroplane had to fly back to the airport of departure cannot be 
a criterion on its own. A variety of situations can be used to illustrate this. For example, 
after flying back to the airport, the passengers depart immediately on another aero‑
plane and still arrive at their final destination on time (or within a reasonable timeframe 
– arriving less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival). Or, after repair, the 
originally planned aeroplane reaches the passengers’ final destination on time (or arrive 
less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival), for example by skipping an 
intermediate landing. In these examples the transport contract has been correctly exe‑
cuted. Making simply flying back to the airport of departure a criterion for cancellation 
– regardless of whether this is a deviation in the originally planned itinerary – would 
give air carriers the wrong incentives. Air carriers would be less motivated to transport 
passengers who had suffered inconveniences as quickly as possible to their destination. 
The EUR 250‑600 compensation is due to be paid anyway (because flying back would 
result in a “cancelled” qualification), whether passengers arrive on time or very late.
e. – sousa rodríguez’s result
1. – Preliminary ruling
Dictum – The C.J.E.U.’s answer to the question that was referred for a preliminary 
ruling:
“‘Cancellation’ […] must be interpreted as meaning that […] it does not refer only to 
the situation in which the aeroplane in question fails to take off at all, but also covers 
 91 See C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez case, para. 34; Opinion AG Sharpston 28 June 2011 (Sousa Rodríguez 
case), para. 30. See, for other references, supra, section I., C.
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the case in which that aeroplane took off but, for whatever reason, was subsequently 
forced to return to the airport of departure where the passengers of the said aero‑
plane were transferred to other flights” (C.J.E.U., Sousa Rodríguez case, dictum 1).
Analysis – The passengers concerned were given the rights under the cancelled flight 
regime on the basis that flying back to the airport of departure was not part of the orig‑
inal planning/itinerary. However, if we analyse how the flight is executed, an alternative 
reasoning can be generated. In casu, the replacement flight not only exceeded the lim‑
its for a normally executed flight (or what would be considered so), 92 it even exceeded 
the five hours’ delay limit 93 (the López Sousa family suffered 24 hours’ delay). There‑
fore, and as a result, this flight should be considered cancelled, and the passengers 
concerned should be accorded the rights they are entitled to under the cancelled flight 
regime.
2. – Predecessors and successors
Cancellation versus delay – From the inception of the APRR’s case law, there has been 
a quest for factors that indicate whether a flight can be qualified as “cancelled”. As has 
been discussed, 94 in the Sturgeon case the C.J.E.U. examined the impact of “delayed” or 
“cancelled” being shown on the airport departures board or announced by the air carri‑
er’s staff, and the impact of the composition of the group passengers. The Court stated 
that these were not conclusive factors. In her Opinion, Advocate General Sharpston 
listed other factors that have been cited before the Court and in national case law and 
legal writing as providing possible indications that a flight has been cancelled: change 
of air carrier, change of aircraft, change of flight number, change of airport of depar‑
ture or arrival, giving baggage back to passengers, new check‑ in for passengers, new 
seating assignment, allocation of all passengers to one or more other aircrafts, issuing 
new boarding passes. She concludes that the more the factors are present together, the 
more likely it becomes that there has been a “cancellation”. Nevertheless, by the same 
token, she does not think that any individual factor can be conclusive. 95 With regard 
to “the passing of time” as a factor in identifying a cancellation, the Advocate General 
states that “time is obviously a factor in identifying whether a flight has been cancelled. 
If a number of the factors listed above are present in combination and/or the flight has 
been delayed for an inordinate period of time, that is a very strong indication that the 
flight has in fact been cancelled”. 96 However, Advocate General Sharpston was unable 
 92 Cf. “departing no more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure and arriving less than 
two hours after the scheduled time of arrival” (article 5(1)(c)(iii)).
 93 Cf. the combination of article 6(1)(iii) with the Sturgeon case.
 94 Supra, section II., C.
 95 See also Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 68‑76.
 96 Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 81.
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to identify exactly what period of time must elapse before a delay becomes “inordi‑
nate” and thus de facto becomes a cancellation. 97
In this context, the Nelson case (C‑ 581/10) could have been even more interesting. 
The Nelsons booked a return flight with Lufthansa from Lagos (Nigeria) to Frankfurt 
am Main (Germany), departing on 27 March 2008 on flight LH 565. The scheduled 
departure time for that return flight was 22.50. However, the return flight did not 
depart at the scheduled time and they were accommodated in a hotel. At 16.00 on 
28 March 2008 they were collected from their hotel and taken to the airport. Flight 
LH 565 finally departed at 01.00 on 29 March 2008 by means of a replacement aircraft 
that Lufthansa had brought in from Frankfurt am Main, which had the same flight num‑
ber and most of the same passengers. The plane landed at Frankfurt am Main at 07.10, 
more than 24  hours later than the arrival time originally scheduled. 98 Because the 
questions referred to the C.J.E.U. primarily concerned the validity of the Sturgeon 
ruling and (some articles of) the APRR, the C.J.E.U. did not tackle the cancellation 
indicators “change of aircraft”, “flight number”, “composition of the group passengers” 
or “the passing of time”.
After the Sousa Rodríguez case supplemented the cancellation indicator list, a very 
similar case (C‑ 151/11 (Condor)) was referred to the C.J.E.U. The difference with 
Sousa Rodríguez was that, after returning to the airport of departure, it was the 
same aeroplane that took off again. The questions referred to the C.J.E.U. were 
more focused on the concept of “discontinuance”, and were as follows: “1. Does a 
passenger have a right to payment of compensation under article 7 [APRR] in the 
case where the flight, following its departure according to schedule, is discontinued 
and the aircraft, before arriving at the airport of destination, returns to the airport 
of departure and subsequently takes off again with a delay which is relevant for 
payment of compensation? 2. Is there a discontinuance in the case where, after the 
aircraft doors have been closed, the journey is not continued? From what point is 
there a discontinuance of the start, rather than a delayed start?” Although the Sousa 
Rodríguez case had not yet been judged, the referring court withdrew its request for 
a preliminary ruling. 99
In a different Condor case (C‑ 680/13), the referring court wondered if “the expres‑
sion cancellation […] [is] to be interpreted as meaning that […] it also applies [to 
the situation] where, although the flight departed under the original flight number, 
it was not a non‑ stop flight as originally planned but involved a stopover scheduled 
before departure, and another aircraft and airline company were used in a sub‑ charter 
 97 See also Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 80‑90.
 98 C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 581/10 (Nelson), para. 15.
 99 By order of 30 May 2011, received at the Court Registry on 8 June 2011, the Landgericht Frankfurt 
am Main informed the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling.
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arrangement”. 100 The time of departure was delayed by two hours, the time of arrival 
by one hour and forty‑ two minutes. 101
Cancellation versus delay versus denied boarding – Not only did the distinction between 
“cancellation” and “delay” raise questions, the concepts’ relationships to “denied board‑
ing” are also unclear. The previously mentioned Cachafeiro case (C‑ 321/11) can be 
used as an illustration: after their preceding flight was delayed one hour and twenty‑ 
five minutes, the passengers concerned arrived just in time for their connecting flight. 
Unfortunately, in anticipation that the delay would result in these two passengers 
missing their connection, the airline cancelled their boarding cards for the connecting 
flight and allocated their seats to other passengers. The applicants reached their final 
destination 27 hours late. 102 In the Bienek case (C‑ 525/08) the referring court wanted 
to know if a change in reservation to another flight (which departed 20 minutes later, 
arrived at a different airport and was instigated by the air carrier or by the tour opera‑
tor), 103 constitutes a situation covered by article 4(3) on denied boarding. 104
Cancellation versus delay versus replacement flights –  The “classic” situation in which 
these three concepts interfere with each other is the following: the flight “for which 
the booking was made” is “cancelled”; passengers are offered a replacement flight, and 
eventually reach their destination with a delay. 105 The Sousa Rodríguez case was dif‑
ferent from this classic situation because the flight “for which the booking was made” 
actually took off (but had to return to the airport of departure later on).
After the Sousa Rodríguez ruling, requests for preliminary rulings involving replace‑
ment flights did not stop. Not surprisingly, other situations occurred and new ques‑
tions arose. For example, the flight “for which the booking was made” was not “can‑
celled” but was fully executed (although with a delay), and there was also a replacement 
flight involved. 106 In three cases (C‑ 262/13 (Aleweld); C‑ 471/13 (Link); C‑ 118/14 
 100 By order of 7 April 2014, received at the Court Registry on 10 April 2014, the Landgericht Frankfurt 
am Main informed the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling.
 101 For more details (in Dutch) see http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof‑ van‑ justitie/nieuwe‑ hofzaken‑ 
inclusief‑ verwijzingsuitspraak/2013/c‑ ‑ zaaknummers/c‑ 680‑13‑ condor‑ flugdienst.html.
 102 Supra, section II., E., 2.
 103 For more details (in Dutch) see http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/ecer/import/ 
hof_van_justitie/nieuwe_hofzaken_inclusief_verwijzingsuitspraak/2008/zaaknummers_501_ 
600/c_525_08_bienek/c‑ 525‑08‑ bienek0001.pdf, para. 1.
 104 By order of 16 December 2009, received at the Court Registry on 18 December 2009, the Bundes‑
gerichtshof informed the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling.
 105 See, for example, C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 173/07 (Emirates Airlines); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 402/07 (Sturgeon); 
C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 549/07 (Wallentin- Hermann); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 204/08 (Rehder); C.J.E.U., Case 
C‑ 294/10 (Eglïtis); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 12/11 (McDonagh).
 106 See also C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 79/14 (TUIfly versus Harald): the time of departure of the flight for which 
the booking was made was advanced without informing Mr and Mrs Harald. As a result, they arrived 
more than 10 hours late. The referred questions were very interesting, but unfortunately by order 
of 6 May 2014, received at the Court Registry on 14 May 2014, the Landgericht Hannover informed 
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(Kieck)) the referring court asked if there is a right under articles 6 and 7 to compensa‑
tion where the departure or arrival of the booked flight is delayed by more than three 
hours, the passenger re‑ books on another airline and the delay on arrival (compared 
with the original flight) is thereby appreciably reduced, whilst both the original flight 
and the replacement flight arrive at the original destination (far) more than three hours 
late. Other referred questions were: Would it be decisive in this regard whether or 
not the period of five hours, specified in article 6(1)(iii), for application of article 8(1) 
had expired? Is it material whether the re‑ booking was made independently by the 
passenger or with the air carrier’s help? 107
Wondering what the repercussions of a “replacement” were, the Brännström case 
(C‑150/12) even put proactive questions and questions concerning what to do in par‑
ticular circumstances to the C.J.E.U.: Can the airline be required, and if so in what 
conditions and to what extent, to have extra resources in the form of, for example, 
aircraft or crew available to operate a flight that would otherwise have had to be can‑
celled, or in order to be able to operate a flight in the place of a flight that has been 
cancelled? What measures must the airline take in order to avoid the obligation to pay 
compensation under article 5(3)? Can an airline be required to offer passengers re‑ 
routing under article 8(1)(b)? In that case, what is the obligation as regards carriage, 
for example, in respect of time of departure and the use of other carriers? 108
Cancellation versus delay versus denied boarding versus replacement flights –  When 
everything happens at the same time, things become complex – for example, in the 
Finnair versus Timy Lassooy case (C‑ 22/11). Following a strike by staff at Barcelona Air‑
port on 28 July 2006, the scheduled 11.40 flight from Barcelona to Helsinki operated 
by Finnair had to be cancelled. In order that the passengers on that flight should not 
have to wait too long, Finnair decided to reschedule subsequent flights. The passengers 
from the cancelled flight were taken to Helsinki on the 11.40 flight the following day, 
29 July 2006, and also on a specially arranged flight departing later that day at 21.40. 
The consequence of that rescheduling was that some of the passengers who had bought 
their tickets for the 11.40 flight on 29 July 2006 had to wait until 30 July 2006 to fly 
to Helsinki on the scheduled 11.40 flight and on a 21.40 flight specially arranged for 
the occasion. Similarly, some passengers, such as Mr Lassooy, who had bought their 
tickets for the 11.40 flight on 30 July 2006 and who had duly presented themselves 
the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling. For more details (in Dutch) see 
http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/ecer/import/hof_van_justitie/nieuwe_
hofzaken_inclusief_verwijzingsuitspraak/2014/c‑ zakennummers/c‑ 79‑14‑ verwijzingsbeschikking.
pdf.
 107 In these three cases, the referring court (the Amtsgericht Rüsselsheim) withdrew its requests for a 
preliminary ruling.
 108 By order of 8  October 2012, received at the Court Registry on 10  October 2012, the Högsta 
 domstolen informed the Court that it was withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling.
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for boarding, flew to Helsinki on the special 21.40 flight later that day. In this case 
dozens of questions arise. Which flight is the one that has been cancelled? Should other 
flights be considered “cancelled” as well? If so, is there a difference for the flights that 
actually took place? Which is or are the delayed flight(s)? How should the replacement 
flight (which was already originally planned by the carrier) be classified? How should 
the specially arranged flight be classified? Must we treat the replacement and specially 
arranged flights differently? Do we take the carrier’s good intentions into account? 
Do we leave the whole situation’s close (inter)connections out of account in order to 
analyse each flight on its own? If a flight is duplicated, which one should we analyse? 
Which is the original planning, which one do we take into account for which flight, 
and what if there is no original planning (or only ad hoc planning)? Does the concept 
of “denied boarding” feature in any of these situations? Etc. And, not discussed in this 
paper but perfect as a grand finale, can the underlying circumstances (a strike by staff) 
that caused this tangled situation be considered as “extraordinary circumstances that 
could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken”? If so, 
what are the repercussions on the passengers’ rights of all the flights concerned? 109 The 
situation described here from the Finnair versus Timy Lassooy case is, unfortunately, not 
a unique one. 110
IV. – General conclusions
Delayed cancellations and cancelled delays – Case law struggles with the APRR’s differ‑
ent categories of “cancellation” and “delay” (and “denied boarding”). Real life causes a 
huge variety of situations, many of which are not easily classified in one category or 
another. Specific criteria were found to resolve specific situations. These good judicial 
intentions unfortunately resulted in a long and casuistic list of inconsistent criteria. 
Legal insecurity eventually won.
Both the Sturgeon and Sousa Rodríguez cases searched for and found criteria. The “itin‑
erary” criterion, which focuses on the flight’s “original planning” in order to decide 
whether a flight can be considered “cancelled”, does not work. Its assumption is based 
 109 The C.J.E.U. decided that “The concept of ‘denied boarding’, within the meaning of articles  2(j) 
and 4 [APRR], must be interpreted as relating not only to cases where boarding is denied because of 
overbooking but also to those where boarding is denied on other grounds, such as operational reasons” 
(C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 22/11 (Finnair), dictum 1) and “Articles 2(j) and 4(3) [APRR] must be interpreted 
as meaning that the occurrence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ resulting in an air carrier  rescheduling 
flights after those circumstances arose cannot give grounds for denying boarding on those later flights 
or for exempting that carrier from its obligation, under article 4(3) [APRR], to compensate a passenger 
to whom it denies boarding on such a flight” (C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 22/11 (Finnair), dictum 2).
 110 See, for example, also C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 658/13 (Spitzner); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 316/12 (Guevara 
Kamm); C.J.E.U., Case C‑ 279/14 (Smets).
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on a fictional situation and has little flexibility (due to its allied yes‑ or‑ no question). 
This criterion is not only hard to put in practice, it can also create the wrong incentives 
and generate undesirable results.
The Sturgeon judgment went beyond the quest for criteria. It changed the legal 
consequences after qualifying a flight as “delayed” and added passenger rights to the 
APRR. Due to this judgment, passengers are now entitled to financial compensation if 
they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally 
scheduled by the air carrier. The C.J.E.U. deduced this time limit from article 5(1)(c)
(iii) but made a calculation error. Article 5(1)(c)(iii) contains an exception in which the 
air carrier does not have to pay the financial compensation in the event of a cancelled 
flight: “[if passengers] are informed of the cancellation less than seven days before the 
scheduled time of departure and are offered re‑ routing, allowing them to depart no 
more than one hour before the scheduled time of departure and to reach their final 
destination less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival”. However, the 
timeframe between departing no more than one hour before and arriving less than two hours 
after the scheduled time does not equals “reaching the final destination three hours or more 
after the arrival time originally scheduled”. Because of this misreading, unequal treat‑
ment between “cancelled” and “delayed” passengers can still occur, which is exactly 
what the Court was trying to eliminate with this judgment. Sturgeon’s impact has 
been huge. Dozens of requests for a preliminary ruling followed, and the APRR is now 
being revised (the Proposal includes the right to compensation in the case of delay).
Reality, time limits and regimes – An alternative concept for the “itinerary criterion” 
could be an analysis of how the flight is executed (the “execution criterion”). This open 
question is more flexible and can reflect reality more accurately. For example, if a 
flight is replaced by another that treats the passengers concerned in exactly the same 
way (and departs and arrives at exactly the same time), we can consider the (replace‑
ment) flight as having been executed in a regular, normal way. It seems entirely logical 
that these passengers are not entitled to the “cancellation” passenger rights. Despite 
the fact that this replacement flight is not the one originally planned, passengers would 
not be able to tell the difference.
A few months before the Sturgeon judgment, Advocate General Sharpston con‑
cluded in her Opinion that, “unlike the [criteria] listed above, the passing of time is 
not susceptible of manipulation”. 111 She posed the question of whether an inordinately 
long delay can become a de facto cancellation. At the time it seemed impossible for 
her to identify, with any acceptable degree of precision, exactly what period of time 
must elapse. 112 However, after the judgment it has been possible to set a time limit. 
 111 Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 77.
 112 See also Opinion AG Sharpston 2 July 2009 (Sturgeon case), para. 80‑90.
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According to the APRR, passengers whose flights are delayed for at least five hours 
differ in only one passenger right from passengers whose flights are cancelled: financial 
compensation. The right to financial compensation is the very right that the C.J.E.U. 
added to the APRR. So there now exists a moment in time where a delay can become 
a de facto cancellation. If we combine this conclusion with the correct reading of arti‑
cle 5(1)(c)(iii) (cf. “one hour before and two hours after”), a clear‑ cut time‑ based sys‑
tem reveals itself. Three regimes can be distinguished. First, we must check whether 
the (replacement) flight departs “no more than one hour before the scheduled time 
of departure and [reaches the passenger’s] final destination less than two hours after 
the scheduled time of arrival” (article 5(1)(c)(iii)). If the flight finds itself within this 
timeframe it must be considered to be a “normally” executed flight. Second, if the 
limit of two hours’ delay is breached, the same regime must be applied as the one that 
applies to “delayed” flights (casu quo article 6). Third, if the delay goes beyond the five 
hour limit, the delayed flight must be put on a par with a “cancelled” flight (due to 
article 6(1)(iii) and the Sturgeon case). In the latter situation, the APRR’s cancellation 
regime (article 5) should be applied. This system combines objectiveness (the passing 
of time), clearness (clear‑ cut limits) and flexibility (the qualification is not fixed, a 
situation can transfer from one category to another). Its aim is not to influence policy 
– time limits are derived from the APRR and C.J.E.U. case law – but instead to create 
legal certainty.
As Albert Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they 
are not certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.” Clearly, this 
rule does not only apply to mathematical laws.
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